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HEY COUNSELOR, CAN YOU SPARE A
DIME? THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S
HIGH-WATER MARK IN CURBING
MERITLESS CHALLENGES OF
ARBITRATION AWARDS
Hill v. Norfolk & Western Railway1
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 1, 1983, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
took on a new face and a new scope in an attempt to slow down the ever
increasing abuses of the judicial system by attorneys.2 By highlighting the
attorney's responsibilities as an officer of the court, rather than as a zealous
advocate of his or her client's interests, the new Rule 11 mandated increased
attention by attorneys to investigating the law and facts submitted in all
papers, to abstaining from litigating for improper purposes, and to
1.. 814 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1987).
2. The amended Rule 11 requires that "every pleading, motion, and other paper" be signed
by an attorney of record "whose address shall be stated" and specifies:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading, motion, or other paper, that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation .
... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it,
a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the [violation], including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Ci. P. 11.
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displaying candor toward the court.a If any of these responsibilities are not
met, "an appropriate sanction" shall be imposed.4
Now in its sixth year, the 'new" Rule 11 has become a tool for district
courts to use in preventing what the Seventh Circuit has termed "a shameful
waste of judicial manpower."' Particularly in the area of arbitration, district
courts are turning to Rule 11 in an effort to turn the tide on the "depress-
ingly large number of recent cases grow[ing] out of refusals to use or abide
by the grievance-arbitration machinery of collective bargaining agreements."6
A collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause "is supposed to insure
speedy resolution of disputes;" hence, those who reject the arbitration
process or its awards "endanger the productivity of the workplace and divert
judicial time from the disputes that courts are supposed to resolve."7
In an attempt to discourage such "refusals to say die (or even to say
try)" in arbitration-related cases, district courts have begun awarding
attorneys' fees against parties making meritless challenges to arbitration
awards.' Even though very few circuits have made use of Rule 11 in this
capacity, the Seventh Circuit has paved the way to do so.9 This Note traces
the history of the Seventh Circuit's recent use of Rule 11 in actions
involving the circumvention of the arbitration process to that circuit's high-
water mark decision in Hill v. Norfolk & Western Railway.1" This history
serves to illuminate the imperative delivered by Judge Posner, not only to
3. In addition to the new Rule 11, Rule 16(f) was amended and 26(g) was added at this
time. Sanctions for delay caused by lack of preparedness at scheduling and pretrial conferences
were authorized under the new Rule 16. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f). A certification procedure
analogous to the Rule 11 procedure was authorized by the new Rule 26(g) for delay and
expense caused by excessive discovery requests. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g). See also Sanctioning
Attorneys for Discovery Abuse--The Recent Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Views from the Bench and Bar, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 671 (1983).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See also Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous
Litigation by Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 300, 301 (1986).
5. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District No. 8 v. Clearing, Inc., 807
F.2d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting Clarion Corp. v. American Home Products Corp., 494
F.2d 860, 865 (7th Cir.1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974)).
6. See Bailey v. Bicknell Minerals, Inc., 819 F.2d 690, 691 (7th Cir. 1987). The court cited
as recent examples, Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1987); Clearing, 807 F.2d
at 618; Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
Dist. No. 8, 802 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1986); International Union of Elevator Constrs. Union v.
Home Elevator Co., 798 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1986).
7. Bailey, 819 F.2d at 691.
8. Id.
9. See Dreis & Krump, 802 F.2d at 247; Clearing, 807 F.2d at 618; Hill, 814 F.2d at 1192;
Bailey, 819 F.2d at 690; Classic Components Supply v. Mitsubishi Electronics of Am., 841 F.2d
163 (7th Cir. 1988).
10. 814 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 1989
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ARBITRATION A WARDS
members of the bar in the Seventh Circuit but to officers of the court
nationwide: "Lawyers practicing in the Seventh Circuit, take heed!""
II. SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURTS UNDER THE "OLD" RULE 11
The first indication that an award of attorneys' fees would be levied by
the Seventh Circuit against parties making meritless challenges to arbitration
awards appeared in Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No.
9.12 The employer in Miller Brewing filed an action to set aside an
arbitrator's award with respect to a collective bargaining agreement's hiring
preference for employees laid off by another employer in a multi-employer
bargaining unit.1 The union filed a counter claim for its enforcement, and
the district court gave summary judgment in favor of the union, awarding
the union its attorneys' fees. 4 The employer appealed, and the court of
appeals, after ordering a revision of the arbitrator's remedy, held that the
district court abused its discretion in awarding the union its attorneys' fees. 5
Miller Brewing was filed before the amended Rule 11 became effective.
Thus, the district court was bound by the "American Rule,"16 which stated
that when no statute allowed for awarding attorneys' fees in a particular
class of cases, the successful party was entitled to attorneys' fees only if his
opponent's suit or defense was frivolous. 7 Neither section 301 of the Taft
Hartley Act 8 nor section 9 of the Uniform Arbitration Act 9 authorizes an
award of attorneys' fees in this class of cases?2 Moreover, the Seventh
Circuit had come to define "frivolous" as meaning "brought in bad faith--
brought to harass rather than to win. "21 Here, the court held that the
company's suit, although partially frivolous, was not frivolous as a whole.2
11. Dreis & Krump, 802 F.2d at 256.
12. 739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir. 1984).
13. Id at 1167.
14. Id
15. Id. at 1168.
16. See, Clearing, 807 F.2d at 622; Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240, 247 (1975).
17. Miller Brewing, 739 F.2d at 1167.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
19. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982).
20. Miller Brewing, 739 F.2d at 1167.
21. Id. See also McCandless v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198, 200 (7th
Cir. 1983).
22. Miller Brewing, 739 F.2d at 1168.
19891
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Before reversing the district court's award of attorneys' fees, however,
the court of appeals embarked on a visionary discussion of the merits of
awarding attorneys' fees to the party successfully defending an arbitration
award. The court pointed out that it would award attorneys' fees against
parties attempting to thwart arbitration awards without justification, and it
observed that such fees had been awarded more generously in those cases
than in other cases of frivolous litigation.' By relying on evidence that
some employers ignore the process "in an effort to convince workers that
unions are paper tigers,"24 that federal policy favors arbitration in general
and labor arbitration in particular, and that the lack of grounds for
attacking arbitration awards makes it "easy to pronounce most such attacks
utterly groundless," the court justified the "seemingly more liberal standard"
used by courts in frivolous arbitration-related actions. 25
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S TRANSITION TO THE NEW RULE 11
Following on the heels of Miller Brewing was Dreis & Krump Manufac-
turing v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District
No. 826 which was filed after the amended Rule 11 became effective. In
Dreis & Krump, an employer filed an action to set aside an arbitrator's
award which ordered the employer to cancel specified subcontracting and to
recall an employee.28 The district court dismissed the case and denied
attorneys' fees to the union.29 Both parties appealed, and the court of
appeals held that the arbitrator's award was valid and that because "[n]o
competent attorney who made a reasonable inquiry into the state of the law
when this suit was filed ... could have thought the suit had any possible
merit,"' the union deserved to have its attorneys' fees paid by the employer
for both the district court and the appellate court proceedings.
31
After noting their stance on frivolous arbitration-related actions prior
to the 1983 amendment of Rule 11 (as voiced in Miller Brewing),32 the court
23. Id.
24. Id See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers Rights to Self Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1787-89, 1797 (1983).
25. Miller Brewing, 739 F.2d at 1168.
26. 802 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1986).




31. Id. at 256.
32. Id. at 254.
[Vol. 1989
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of appeals emphasized the new rule's provision for sanctions on the basis
of "[p]leadings that do not reflect the signing attorney's 'belief formed after
reasonable inquiry [that the pleading] is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."33  According to the court, the
district court's denial of the union's motion for attorneys' fees under Rule
11 without explanation was an abuse of discretion.' The court remarked
that the employer's attorney should have known the claim was time-barred
and failed to classify as one of the limited number of suits eligible for
having a labor arbitrator's award set aside.35  The court acceded the
employer did not act in bad faith, but stressed that the test under the new
Rule 11 was an objective test, which was wholly failed in this instance.36
Moreover, the court premised an award of attorneys' fees at the appellate
level on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38,31 which entitles an award
of "just damages and single or double costs" for a frivolous appeal to the
appellee. 3
Prior to affirming the judgment dismissing the employer's action and
reversing the dismissal of the union's motion for attorneys' fees, the court
of appeals took the time, as Judge Posner put it, "to make clear that the
[employer's] attack on the [arbitration] award was frivolous."39 Noting the
employer's deep conviction that the subcontracting did not violate the
collective bargaining agreement, the court nevertheless maintained that the
amended Rule 11 made it "clear that he who seeks vindication in such
circumstances and fails to get it must pay his opponent's reasonable
33. Id. at 255.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. See also Brown v. National Board of Medical Examiners, 800 F.2d 168, 171-72 (7th
Cir. 1986); Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 851
(1986); Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1985); Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1985); Schwarzer, Sanctions
Under the New Federal Rule 11--A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 191 (1985).
37. Dreis & Krump, 802 F.2d at 255.
38. Id. See FED. R. App. P. 38. As the court asserts, Rule 38 has been interpreted to
allow an award of attorneys' fees. Dreis & Krump, 802 F.2d at 255. See also Note of Advisory
Committee on Rule 38; Indianapolis Colts, 775 F.2d at 184. The court bolsters this
interpretation by maintaining that such fees "are normally and here the principal item of damage
to the appellee." Dreis & Krump, 802 F.2d at 255.
39. Dreis & Krump, 802 F.2d at 254.
19891
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attorneys' fees."' Finally, the court drove home the message that the "new"
Rule 11 had arrived in the Seventh Circuit's arsenal to combat "mounting
federal case loads" and "growing public dissatisfaction with the costs and
delays of litigation" by proclaiming that the rules designed to hinder
meritless litigation "will continue to be enforced in this circuit to the hilt."4
The echoes of this proclamation, combined with Judge Posner's closing
admonition, "Lawyers practicing in the Seventh Circuit, take heed!", 2 are
still reverberating in the Seventh Circuit's district courts today.
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S USE OF RULES 11 AND 38 TODAY
Barely two months after Judge Posner's castigation of Dreis & Krump's
attorneys, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
District No. 8 v. Clearing Inc.4 3 was decided. In Clearing, the union filed an
action under the Labor Management Relations Act" to enforce two
arbitration awards rendered in its favor against the employer. The district
court entered judgment for the union and assessed attorneys' fees against
the employer.4 5 On the employer's appeal, the court of appeals held that
the district court abused its discretion in awarding the union attorneys' fees
because the employer's trial position was not unreasonable," but then held
that the employer's appeal regarding the district court's credibility findings
on the issue of contract formation was frivolous.47  Hence, the court
awarded the union its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees on appeal which
40. Id. at 255. The court added that "li]t is human nature to crave vindication of a
passionately held position even if the position lacks an objectively reasonable basis in law." Id
Yet, the court observed:
[a] company dissatisfied with the decisions of labor arbitrators need not include an
arbitration clause in its collective bargaining contracts, but having agreed to include such
a clause it will not be permitted to nullify the advantages to the union by spinning out the
arbitral process unconscionably through the filing of meritless suits and appeals. For such
conduct the law authorizes sanctions that this court will not hesitate to impose.
Id.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 256.
43. 807 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1986).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1978).
45. Clearing, 807 F.2d at 622.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 623. The court went on to expound in a footnote that "an appeal is frivolous
where the result is obvious or when the appellant's argument is wholly without merit." Id
(quoting Spiegel v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 1986), cert
denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986)).
[Vol. 1989
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were attributable to the litigation of the contract formation issue, one-half
to be paid by the employer and one-half to be paid by its counsel. 4s
If Dreis & Krump failed to send a loud enough message regarding the
effect of Rule 11 on the pursuit of groundless arbitration-related claims,
Clearing turned up the volume noticeably. Asserting that the employer's
arguments on appeal were "nothing more than a restatement of its position
rejected by the district court and an attempt to plead that the district court
should have credited its witnesses rather than the testimony presented by the
[union], 49 the court of appeals decided sanctions were appropriate under
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.' Simply put, "[tihis
case 'has caused a shameful waste of judicial manpower'"5' and "has caused
this court to spend valuable time and energy on a completely meritless
matter while the serious concerns of other litigants have had to wait for
resolution."52
V. THE HIGH-WATER MARK IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S
MODERN USE OF RULES 11 AND 38
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
Three months later, Hill v. Norfolk and Western Railway5" was decided
and further accentuated the dangers of pursuing meritless arbitration-related
causes in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In Hill, a railroad
brakeman filed an action seeking to set aside a public law board's decision
rejecting his claim that he had been fired in violation of a collective
bargaining agreement between the railroad and his union. The district court
ruled in favor of the railroad, and the brakeman appealed.54 The court of
appeals found the employee's appeal frivolous and required his attorney to
bear personally the expenses incurred by the railroad in defending the
appeal.55
48. Clearing, 807 F.2d at 623. See also Thornton, 787 F.2d at 1154.
49. Clearing, 807 F.2d at 623.
50. Id.
51. Id (quoting Clarion Corp. v. American Home Products Corp., 494 F.2d 860, 865 (7th
Cir. 1974)).
52. Id at 623. See also Ruderer v. Fines, 614 F.2d 1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 1980).
53. 814 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1987).
54. Id at 1194.
55. Id. at 1203.
19891
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B. The Court's Analysis: A High-Water Mark Reached
After distinguishing Miller Brewing, the grandfather of this line of Rule
11 cases, the court acknowledged that Rule 11 had not been incorporated
into the court's rules and that it did not directly apply to proceedings in
that court.5 7 However, the court asserted that Rule 11 provided guidance
in interpreting the rules that did control.58 The court further submitted that
Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed even though the railroad did not request
attorneys' fees59 and that because this "railroad brakeman" was not
responsible "for frivolous legal arguments," the brakeman's counsel must
"bear personally the expenses incurred by the railroad in briefing the issues"
that the court found were frivolously raised by the brakeman's opening
brief. °
The court brought the opinion to its completion with a discussion of
the court's power to notch this high-water mark by ordering attorneys to
bear personally Rule ll/Rule 38 sanctions and the appropriate procedures
followed in doing so.6' After analogizing Rule 38 sanctions to disciplinary
sanctions under Rule 46(c) 62 and after urging the applicability of 28 U.S.C.
section 1927 to cases meriting Rule 38 sanctions,63 the court announced that
the requirements of due process are applicable to proceedings requiring
56. Id at 1200.
57. Id
58. Id The court lists Fed. R. App. Proc. 38 & 46, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1912 & 1927 as the
rules that do control. Id at 1201. See also Thornton, 787 F.2d at 1151; In re Kelly, 808 F.2d
549 (7th Cir. 1986).
59. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1200. See also Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091, 1098
(7th Cir. 1987).
60. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1201. The Court further remarks that it has "[oln several occasions
in recent years ordered counsel to bear personally the expense of sanctions under Rule 38." Id.
See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 809 F.2d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 1987); Thornton, 787 F.2d
at 1154; Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 88-89 (7th Cir. 1985)(per curiam); Reid v.
United States, 715 F.2d 1148, 1155 (7th Cir. 1983).
61. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1201-03.
62. Id at 1201. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c) provides:
A court of appeals may, after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the
contrary, and after hearing, if requested, take any appropriate disciplinary action against
any attorney who practices before it for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or for
failure to comply with these rules or any rule of court."
63. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1201. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) states: "Any attorney or other person
admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be
required by the court to satisfy personally such excess costs."
8
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section 1927 sanctions,' necessitating notice and an opportunity to be heard
"if a factual question coneeming the propriety of sanctions is raised."6 The
court further noted that a hearing may only be had in cases where it will
assist the court in its decision6 and insisted that in most Rule 38, cases "the
conduct that is sought to be sanctioned consists of making objectively
groundless legal arguments in briefs filed in this court [such that] there are
no issues that a hearing could illuminate."67
Before disposing of the case, the court observed that intentional or
even negligent misconduct was not required for Rule 38 sanctions.' The
standard is merely "objectively groundless legal arguments" with monetary
sanctions warranted "[t]o protect this court's ability to serve litigants with
meritorious cases and in order to make lawyers give thoughtful consideration
to whether there are grounds for an appeal before filing an appeal."'
Furthermore, the court maintained that the text of Rule 38 and their
previous decisions applying it provided sufficient notice to the attorney that
sanctions may be imposed without a hearing if there were no contested
factual questions.' Judge Posner, ever so attentive to the attorneys
practicing in the Seventh Circuit, closes the opinion as follows:
[algain we remind the bar that whether the suit is brought by the
company or the union or, as here, by an individual employee, if it is
frivolous in whole or in part this court will impose sanctions .... We
are in a transitional period, and some members of the bar still do not
64. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1201. See, Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980);
Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 570-71 (3d Cir. 1985)(en banc).
65. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1201. See In re Kelly, 808 F.2d at 552. See also Shrock v. Altru
Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d 658, 661-62 (7th Cir. 1987) (wherein the court ordered a hearing
before imposing the sanctions to determine whether the factual investigation by the plaintiff's
attorney before filing the action was sufficient).
66. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1201. Cf Lepucki, 765 F.2d at 87-88; United States v. Blodgett, 709
F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1983).
67. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1201. The court goes on to say "[all the relevant 'conduct' is laid out
in the briefs themselves; neither the mental state of the attorney nor any other factual issue is
pertinent to the imposition of sanctions for such conduct. Where a hearing would be pointless
it is not required." Id. at 1201-02.
68. I. at 1202.
69. Id. The court further remarked "[t]his is not a new principle. The filing of an appeal
should never be a conditioned reflex." Id The court cited 1 Jessup, Elihu Root 133 (1938) for
the proposition that "[albout half the practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling would-be
clients that they are damned fools and should stop." Id
70. Id.
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realize that the judicial attitude toward attorney misconduct has
stiffened. They had better realize it." (emphasis supplied). 1
VI. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S MOST RECENT USE OF RULES 11 AND 38
The most recent addition to this Rule 11/Rule 38 family of cases in the
Seventh Circuit came to life one month after Hill in the form of Bailey v.
Bicknell Minerals, Inc.72 In Bailey, a union president filed an action against
the employer following the employer's rejection of a grievance over the
implementation of a collective bargaining agreement addendum approved by
telephonic votes of the union's "pit committee."' The action was filed
before a demand for arbitration. The employer moved for dismissal, and
the district court granted the dismissal because the union failed to exhaust
the contractual grievance resolution machinery.74 On appeal, the court
affirmed the district court's decision, found the appeal frivolous, and
awarded attorneys' fees to the employer to be paid in whole by the union's
counsel.75
Building on the wisdom of Dreis & Krump, Clearing, and Hill, the court
continued to send a loud message to the lawyers in the Seventh Circuit.
Citing the "plaintiffs obduracy" and "the obtuseness of their lawyer," the
court eagerly consented to the employer's plea for an award of attorneys'
fees.76 The court observed that the arguments on appeal were "neither
preserved in the District Court nor plausible as original matters;" that the
union failed to file a reply brief stating why their claims had merit or why
an award of attorneys' fees was inappropriate for some other reason; and
that because the same attorney represented the union from start to finish,
he or she had an obligation to tell the union that the law was against
71. Id. at 1203. Bolstering his warning, Judge Posner adds:
The promise of arbitration is spoiled if parties disappointed by its results can delay the
conclusion of the proceeding by groundless litigation in the district court followed by
groundless appeal to this court; we have said repeatedly that we would punish such tactics,
and we mean it .... The reasons are systemic. As the federal courts become more and
more overloaded, the costs imposed on ethical and responsible litigants when judicial
resources are diverted to the processing of frivolous claims and defenses mount higher and
higher. Moreover, as the bar and the judiciary both expand, the incentive for self-
regulation by lawyers that comes from appearing regularly before the same judges
diminishes, making judicial regulation by sanctions increasingly necessary.
lit
72. 819 F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1987).
73. Id at 691.
74. Id.
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them. 77 Accordingly, the court invoked Rule 38 and ordered "counsel for
the [union] to pay, out of his own pocket, the attorneys' fees reasonably
incurred by [the employer] in defending against the appeal."7 '
Since Bailey, the Seventh Circuit has had to blow its horn only once
more in the case of Classic Components v. Mitsubishi.79  In Mitsubishi, a
distributor filed an action in a state court seeking an injunction to compel
a manufacturer to continue using it as a distributor. The manufacturer
removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction and moved for
arbitration.80 The district court ordered arbitration and denied the request
for a preliminary injunction.8t On appeal, the distributor asked for an
injunction pending appeal. The court of appeals denied this request, finding
that the distributor had satisfied none of the criteria for an injunction
pending appeal, and ordered the distributor to reimburse the manufacturer
for its expenses in defending the claim.82
VII. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has sent a resounding admoni-
tion to the attorneys of the Seventh Circuit and beyond. From the "old"
Rule 11 days of Miller Brewing to the modern conglomeration of the "new"
Rule 11, Rule 38, and U.S.C. section 19 2 7 , 3 the message has remained
consistent: attorneys' fees will be awarded against parties challenging
arbitration awards without basis--often more freely than in other instances
77. Id.
78. Id. The Court went on to allow the employer 15 days to file with the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals an itemized statement of their fees. Id
79. 841 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1988).
80. Id at 164.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 165-66. The court justified the award under Rule 38 by adding:
Shallow claims may require costly replies. [The distributor's] motions papers did not cite
or discuss any of the relevant cases; [the manufacturer] had to dig them up itself, incurring
costs that the American Rule supposes fall on the movant. When a party files papers that
can yield only one outcome, the time and money spent resisting the claim is wasted at best,
a potential source of bargaining leverage for the movant at worst. The need to pay one's
lawyer adds injury to the insult of the frivolous motion. The American Rule is not
supposed to enable a litigant to impose self-help penalties on its rival by filing pointless
motions that are costly to defend. A moving party that bears its adversary's fees and costs
will think twice about making motions, as it should; the party in the right will be relieved
of the burden that should not have been created in the first place.
Id at 166.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
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of frivolous litigation.' While such a message manifested itself in the form
of a general award of attorneys' fees in the beginning,' the harbinger has
grown over the last couple years into Hill's deafening blow to lawyers' own
pocketbooks.'
Will it work? It seems to be. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has not had to blow its horn in the arbitration arena for several months
now, and the loud and clear message from these five cases is in all
likelihood the reason.
ROBERT K. ANGSTEAD
84. See Dreis & Krump, 802 F.2d at 254-55.
85. See Id. at 256.
86. See Clearing, 807 F.2d at 623; Hill, 814 F.2d at 1201; Bailey, 819 F.2d at 693.
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